The Major Questions Doctrine and Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump

In my Administrative Law and Statutory Interpretation classes, we talk about how broadly or narrowly the courts should construe ambiguous phrases or passing references when Congress delegates some authority, or entrusts some responsibility, to the Executive Branch. Last Friday, the Supreme Court revisited this in the landmark case Learning Resources Inc. v. Trump (2026).

This isn't just about the $175 billion in tariffs or the trade deficit; it’s about how a single word in a 1977 statute became the front line for the modern Major Questions Doctrine (MQD).

The Statutory "Sleight of Hand" The administration’s entire legal argument rested on two words in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA): "regulate" and "importation". They argued that because the President can "regulate importation" during a national emergency, he can naturally impose a tariff.

But as I discuss in the video, Chief Justice Roberts—and five other justices—weren't buying it. The Court noted that the U.S. Code is filled with statutes where the Executive "regulates" things, but the power to regulate has never been a back door to the power to tax. In fact, reading the statute that way would make IEEPA partly unconstitutional, as it would allow the President to tax exports—something the Constitution explicitly forbids.

The Splintered Bench: Six Opinions, One Result While the 6-3 result was clear, the reasoning was a masterclass in modern judicial philosophy. If you’re preparing for an exam, pay close attention to the six separate writings:

  • The Plurality (Roberts, Gorsuch, Barrett): Applied the Major Questions Doctrine with full force. They argued that if Congress meant to delegate the "transformative" power to levy unbounded tariffs, it wouldn't have hidden that power in a general word like "regulate".

  • The Liberal Concurrence (Kagan, Sotomayor, Jackson): They reached the same result but rejected the MQD framework entirely. For them, "ordinary" statutory interpretation—looking at text and context—was enough to see that "regulate" does not mean "tax".

  • The Jackson Concurrence: Justice Jackson wrote separately to emphasize the legislative history of IEEPA, arguing that Congress intended it only for freezing foreign assets, not raising revenue.

  • The Gorsuch & Barrett Concurrences: These two sparred over the theory of the MQD—Gorsuch defending it as a vital check on the "administrative state," and Barrett questioning if it’s a substantive canon or just a tool of linguistic context.

  • The Dissents (Kavanaugh, Thomas, Alito): Justice Kavanaugh’s 63-page dissent is the most comprehensive defense of executive trade power, arguing for a "foreign-affairs exception" to the MQD.

Why This Matters for Your Exams This case isn't just about trade; it’s the new high-water mark for the MQD. It proves that even "national security" and "emergencies" do not provide a safe harbor for the Executive if the underlying statutory language is vague.

Watch my full analysis of the case below:

Professor Stevenson is the Vinson and Elkins Research Professor and Professor of Law at South Texas College of Law Houston. Faculty bio: https://www.stcl.edu/profile/dru-stevenson/ 

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