Seventh Circuit Clarifies Facial vs. As‑Applied Challenges to § 922(g)(1) in Prince and Watson

The Seventh Circuit issued three Second Amendment decisions on April 2, all involving the federal felon‑in‑possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The most notable is United States v. Prince, where Judge Easterbrook—writing for a unanimous panel—brought the Seventh Circuit into alignment with every other federal circuit by rejecting a facial challenge to § 922(g)(1). The court emphasized that the statute has many unquestionably constitutional applications, which is enough to defeat a facial attack under standard principles of constitutional adjudication.

The panel was careful, however, not to resolve the more difficult question that has occupied courts since Bruen: whether § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to individuals whose prior convictions are non‑violent or otherwise do not suggest dangerousness. That issue remains open in the Seventh Circuit.

A companion case, United States v. Watson, illustrates the court’s incremental approach. Chief Judge Brennan upheld § 922(g)(1) as applied to a defendant with a prior felony drug‑distribution conviction, treating drug‑dealing as inherently dangerous and therefore within the historical tradition of disarming persons who pose a threat to public safety. The opinion expressly declines to say whether the same reasoning would apply to non‑dangerous felonies.

One notable feature of Watson is the panel’s response to the argument that a lifetime firearm prohibition is too severe to be justified by historical analogues. The court pointed to the federal gun‑rights‑restoration mechanism in 18 U.S.C. § 925(c)—a process the Department of Justice has recently revived after decades of dormancy—as evidence that the federal scheme is not necessarily permanent. That observation will matter going forward, especially as courts confront as‑applied challenges brought by individuals whose prior convictions are remote in time or non‑violent in character. (I am finishing a law review article on the newly revived § 925(c) program, so this aspect of the opinion particularly stood out.)

The third case, Karwacki v. Kaul, concerns the interaction between state firearm disabilities and military convictions, rather than the Second Amendment directly, but it rounds out the court’s effort to clear several pending firearms cases in the post‑Bruen landscape.

Taken together, these decisions bring the Seventh Circuit into the national consensus on the facial validity of § 922(g)(1), while leaving room for future as‑applied challenges in cases involving non‑dangerous felonies. For now, the court is proceeding cautiously, deciding only what is necessary and leaving the broader theoretical questions for another day.